From Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Boumediene

The framework of the decision:

Based on this language from Eisentrager, and the reasoning in our other extraterritoriality opinions, we conclude that at least three factors are relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.

On (1):

But the petitioners in Eisentrager did not contest, it seems, the Court’s assertion that they were “enemy alien[s].”  Ibid.  In the instant cases, by contrast, the detainees deny they are enemy combatants.

On (2):

But there are critical differences between Landsberg Prison, circa 1950, and the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay in 2008.  Unlike its present control over the naval station, the United States’ control over the prison in Germany was neither absolute nor indefinite.  Like all parts of occupied Germany, the prison was under the jurisdiction of the combined Allied Forces. 

On (3):

The Government presents no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims.

On Congresses’s Habeas-suspending powers:

In light of this holding the question becomes whether the statute stripping jurisdiction to issue the writ avoids the Suspension Clause mandate because Congress has provided adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus.

 Our case law does not contain extensive discussion of standards defining suspension of the writ or of circumstances under which suspension has occurred.  This simply confirms the care Congress has taken throughout our Nation’s history to preserve the writ and its function.

That the statutes in Hayman and Swain were designed to strengthen, rather than dilute, the writ’s protections was evident, furthermore, from this significant fact: Neither statute eliminated traditional habeas corpus relief.  In both cases the statute at issue had a saving clause, providing that a writ of habeas corpus would be available if the alternative process proved inadequate or ineffective.  

In passing the DTA Congress did not intend to create a process that differs from traditional habeas corpus process in name only.  It intended to create a more limited procedure.  See, e.g., 151 Cong. Rec. S14263 (Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (noting that the DTA “extinguish[es] these habeas and other actions in order to effect a transfer of jurisdiction over these cases to the DC Circuit Court” and agreeing that the bill “create[s] in their place a very limited judicial review of certain military administrative decisions”); id., at S14268 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“It is important to note that the limited judicial review authorized by paragraphs 2 and 3 of subsection (e) [of DTA §1005] are not habeas-corpus review.  It is a limited judicial review of its own nature”). 

 

We do not endeavor to offer a comprehensive summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.  We do consider it uncontroversial, however, that the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to “the erroneous application or interpretation” of relevant law.  St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 302.

 

Conclusion:

In cases involving foreign citizens detained abroad by the Executive, it likely would be both an impractical and unprecedented extension of judicial power to assume that habeas corpus would be available at the moment the prisoner is taken into custody.  If and when habeas corpus jurisdiction applies, as it does in these cases, then proper deference can be accorded to reasonable procedures for screening and initial detention under lawful and proper conditions of confinement and treatment for a reasonable period of time. 

 

The only law we identify as unconstitutional is MCA §7, 28 U. S. C. A. §2241(e) (Supp. 2007).  Accordingly, both the DTA and the CSRT process remain intact.  Our holding with regard to exhaustion should not be read to imply that a habeas court should intervene the moment an enemy combatant steps foot in a territory where the writ runs.  The Executive is entitled to a reasonable period of time to determine a detainee’s status before a court entertains that detainee’s habeas corpus petition.  The CSRT process is the mechanism Congress and the President set up to deal with these issues.  Except in cases of undue delay, federal courts should refrain from entertaining an enemy combatant’s habeas corpus petition at least until after the Department, acting via the CSRT, has had a chance to review his status. 

 

Entire opinion can be found here.