has been greatly exaggerated. The constant drum-beat of gloom against the “moral emptiness” of liberalism has been sounded for quite some time (and I must confess I was an unfortunate participant in the chorus earlier on in my academic life). While it certainly does not culminate in this article in Prospect, the arguments are notably typical.
The critique goes something like this: Liberalism, in championing pluralism to such an extent, makes it very difficult for people to be free to pursue their own ends because it conditions people to accept that they are their own best judge on what is and is not morally acceptable regardless of how preposterous their moral choices. This gives rise to cynicism, relativism, etc. that poison our values and make us he vapid, dishonorable, and viscous creatures that we are today.
There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it does not acknowledge that liberalism originated itself, as a resistance movement to the stagnation of moral understanding that had formed between 16th-18th Century Europe. For example, Immanuel Kant’s case for Enlightenment rest on being allowed to push forward in making our moral world more intelligible. Enforcing a comprehensive moral understanding of an illiberal sort will likely lead to the same future stagnation. When that day comes, we will probably wish we had toleration back.
Second, the best liberals (Kant, Rawls, Nozick, Locke, Berlin, Mill, etc.) are all interested in moral philosophy. Many of the rest of us fall short of realizing this liberal ideal. However, it is not clear that the philosophy itself is the causal agent. The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our belief in society as a fair system of cooperation, but in our empiricism. The great thinkers listed above all thought seriously about questions of how we come to believe that we know something, and this is where our political culture seems to have simply quit en masse.
The problem lies in the common belief that, to paraphrase Allan Bloom’s observations of his students, “truth is relative, and everyone is entitled to his or her opinion” is not a distinctly liberal phenomenon, as we see it advanced and countered as far back as Plato’s Republic. A liberalism with a serious epistemic foundation works better than any particular moral system because it is the least threatened by the new discoveries of our evolving understanding of the world. No system without a serious epistemic foundation works well at all. The argument against liberalism, in this context, boils down to surrendering on truth and just forcing one system on everyone for the sake of coherence and expediency. The author of this piece cites Alisdair MacIntyre approvingly, let us not forget that the only advice we get from MacIntyre at the end of After Virtue, is to “pick a philosophy and jump, and don’t look back.” Or, put another way, it is better to be against truth-tracking in bad faith than it is to be against it in good faith. Good liberals believe that it is better not to be against it at all. You tell me which sounds like the most morally empty position.