Richard Posner’s understanding of the Geithner plan on “toxic assets” and why we ought to be satisfied with it as a solution is very well stated.
A problem with that approach, however–a political rather than an economic problem, if politics can be separated from economics in a depression (I don’t think it can be)–is that the government doesn’t want to ask Congress for more money to lend to banks because “Wall Street” has been thoroughly demonized by an ignorant (or demagogic) Congress and the ignorant media. The Federal Reserve, it is true, could infuse cash into the banks, without having to go to Congress, just by buying the overvalued assets. But that approach has two problems. First, if the Fed just pays the actual value of the assets, it isn’t doing much for the banks–it is not expanding their balance sheet–but if it overpays, it will be fiercely criticized as being in the pocket of Wall Street.
In short, since the most direct economic route is unfeasible politically, Geithner’s plan represents a way to do the same thing indirectly while not triggering public anger.
On Benjamin Barber’s blog, he writes:
But Geithner has a problem: capitalism’s recipe makes profit the reward entrepreneurs receive for taking risks. The collapse of trust in the global fiscal system, however, means no one wants to take risks anymore. They will take the profits, yes, but not the risks.
I suspect that Barber here is sounding an excessively populist note. Ultimately, he still endorses Obama and Geithner because:
Geithner showed a second face at the Council, as well, and this is the good news. For he said repeatedly that the greatest danger of our time was not government doing too much but government doing too little; that recovery would require persistent experimentation; that if market solutions and public-private partnerships fail, other option must and will be explored. Like the President he serves, Geithner may believe in markets but he is a pragmatist, a progressive and a Democrat, and seems willing, if market strategies fail (as they will), to abandon them in favor of whatever works.
Depending on what “market strategies” means, I am not sure that I agree with Barber that they will fail (not that it is clear what the standard is for “failing” either) I think that in this case, Posner is correct that the pragmatic strategy is a market strategy. I must confess that in reading Barber and from being his student for two courses, it is not clear to me precisely what markets do in his view of politics. He argues strongly that they do not trump the public good, and since he has many opponents that believe that markets and the public good are always the same, this takes the appearance of an important stand. However saying the role of markets “ought not be x” is not the same thing as saying what, precisely, markets are supposed to be doing. Barber’s criticism of Geithner creates the impression one cannot be a pragmatist and a market capitalist because all capitalist strategies are inherently ideological strategies.
If I’m not mistaken, Barber is a dialectician. He believes that critical tensions invariably lead to critical failure of systems and so they must be resolved. This position, one could argue, is more ideological than pragmatic. For a pragmatist may very well conclude that some tensions must simply be accommodated. This seems to be the Geithner/Obama approach to our economic crisis. And, for what it is worth, for all the talk about market ideology in Barber’s post, it is worth noting that it is Posner who demonstrates more practical flexibility in endorsing Geithner’s plan than Barber.
Posted by stevenmaloney
Posted by stevenmaloney
Posted by stevenmaloney 


